World War III can wait

The war has lasted for over a year and has received a great deal of worldwide attention. Reactions have followed familiar patterns: public opinion in the West speaks of Israeli genocide against Palestinians and sings of liberation "from the River to the Sea," while a quieter group tries to highlight Hamas and Hezbollah's terrorist ties and their intent to destroy Israel. Meanwhile, the Israeli army has been ruthlessly eliminating terrorists, sometimes using methods reminiscent of a Bond movie, with exploding pagers and walkie-talkies.

What has NOT happened, which many feared, is a major escalation toward a larger war that could ultimately pull in Iran, Russia, and the USA into a bottomless quagmire.

Why has this not happened, and why is the background so underreported?

Nearly every article and statement is based on an understanding of the Middle East as it appeared in the days of Yasser Arafat. But that understanding is now outdated. I even wonder if those who “analyze” the Middle East in Swedish media have visited the region in the past ten years? Have they talked to any Arabs or Israelis—other than PLO’s followers and Hamas’s friends, that is…

Everything changed with the Abraham Accords in 2020. These are the agreements in which several key Arab countries recognize Israel. The accords have laid the foundation for extensive trade, tourism, and innovation exchanges between these countries. Notably, it is primarily the wealthy Arab countries that have signed the accords, except for Qatar (politically closer to Iran), Kuwait (with a large Palestinian minority), Oman (which follows its own path), and, for now, Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, it is mainly failed states (like Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon) that have not signed on.

When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, Svenska Dagbladet’s analyst Jesper Sundén wrote, among other things: “But above all, Tuesday’s signing at the White House is about arms deals, national interests, and American jobs.” And TT’s first tweet on the subject: “Betrayed - again. The feeling is familiar among Palestinians since Arab countries found more important priorities. The peace agreements of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain with Israel tear apart decades of Arab solidarity to unite against a common enemy.”

These narratives belong to Iran, the PLO, and Hamas. Those against détente and the Abraham Accords paint a picture that it’s solely about “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” meaning that resistance against Iran is the only factor behind this détente and normalization. And, of course, that Trump’s only idea was to peddle more weapons in the region. This analysis is both incredibly naive and wrong.

Iran is certainly ONE piece of the puzzle, an important one primarily because it has made it politically possible for Arab leaderships to overcome decades of mistrust. But the root causes go far deeper.

The entire fundamental strategy characterizing the GCC region—to reduce dependence on oil and transition to greater entrepreneurship and innovation—risks being put on pause, or even regressing, if war escalates in the area. This naturally makes the leaders of the Arab countries worry about their nations’ economic futures—and thus their own power bases. American weapons? Good grief, there are plenty of other countries to buy weapons from, and the U.S.’s actual influence over the GCC has waned as America’s focus has turned inward rather than outward.

But one of the most important reasons for normalization is the old Gunnar Hökmark Doctrine: “If you keep doing what you’ve been doing, you’ll get the results you’ve always gotten.” For decades, the PLO has proven utterly incapable of using the leverage they’ve had in the region. Instead, Palestinian leadership has been marked by a world-leading level of incompetence, corruption, and failure to improve Palestinians' situation.

What has happened, which Swedish media entirely misses, is that the Arab world has grown tired of the PLO. And that they despise both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Instead, they assess that normalizing relations with Israel allows negotiations about the Palestinians’ future to be placed in their hands—instead of with a marginalized PLO. And the likelihood of Arab countries succeeding is far greater than that of the PLO succeeding. Naturally, the PLO is furious about having lost its power base!

Why would Arab countries succeed better than the PLO? Because they are far more competent than the PLO in every individual matter. And because they have the economic power to genuinely make a difference in discussions with Israel. For Israel, a solution leading to regional stability and security—and access to a vast market—is obviously preferable.

So, the normalization we saw before the Gaza War wasn’t primarily about Iran or arms purchases. It was about the PLO’s incompetence and, above all, the fact that countries collectively and individually stand to gain significantly—in terms of security and future growth. This was likely also a motivating factor behind Hamas’s attack on Israel in 2023: a desire not only to harm Israel but also to take revenge on the Arab countries that signed the accords by creating war in the region.

What has happened in the Gaza conflict is exactly what the Abraham Accords anticipated. The Arab countries have NOT escalated the conflict. Quite the contrary. Both Saudi Arabia and Jordan have shot down missiles headed for Israel. And in October, the next step emerged: an Arab and Muslim coalition aimed at achieving a two-state solution. I am convinced it will result in both a security guarantee for Israel and a substantial financial commitment to rebuild Gaza after the war—a Palestine without either Hamas or Hezbollah. But that won’t happen unless Israel first drives out Hamas and weakens Hezbollah.

If this guarantee and commitment are strong enough, the idea, I assume, is to offer Israel full diplomatic recognition and intensive trade with its Arab neighbors in exchange for Israel accepting a two-state solution and rolling back settlements in the West Bank.

It’s a high-level puzzle with plenty of pitfalls. But for the first time, it seems that no one in the Middle East actually wants war (except, of course, the terrorist organizations). Additionally, behind-the-scenes relations between Arab states and Israel remain good, while Iran has apparently been kept relatively calm. Even Hezbollah doesn’t seem to be getting full support from Tehran.

The toughest obstacle to this scenario now seems to be within Netanyahu’s government.

The biggest losers, if this succeeds, are of course Hamas and Hezbollah but also the PLO and UNRWA. And if it does succeed, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may emerge as the great statesman of the Middle East, a role he surely wants.

Perhaps, on the contrary, there is a bright glimmer of hope here: that the Arab world will take responsibility for the region’s future—not without Israel but together with Israel—and against extremists from all sides. This has been reinforced since Trump’s election victory in early November. Just days after the election, Qatar announced that Hamas leaders are no longer welcome in the country—a significant blow to them, as they have so far been able to live comfortably in the small Gulf state. Shortly thereafter, Qatar also announced that it was withdrawing from the mediator role it had assumed. My analysis is that they assess that Trump will push through a Middle East peace that excludes Hamas and Hezbollah and indeed welcomes Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s responsibility for Gaza. Qatar’s role in this puzzle is minimal, given its history of ties with extremists.

How Hamas’s friends in Malmö or Hezbollah’s associates in the suburbs of Europe’s capitals will react to this development remains to be seen. But today, it should be clear that it is rather we in the West, not the Arab countries, who face the greatest issues with extremist Islamism. This is also an insight that analysts and the media largely miss.

Stockholm on the 13th of November, 2024

Sven Otto Littorin

Partner, Stadsholmen Equity